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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2276
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANDRE M. HUGGINS,
                                      Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 03-cr-00091-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 21, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
              Opinion filed: June 29, 2010                     
__________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Andre Huggins appeals the District Court’s order granting appellee’s
motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons below, we will affirm.
       Huggins was subsequently convicted by a jury of several of the charges.1
2
The procedural history of this case and the details of Huggins’s claims are
well known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinion, and need not
be discussed at length.  Briefly, several items of personal property were seized from
Huggins when he was arrested on charges of money laundering and drug trafficking.  1
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) sent notices of forfeiture via certified mail to
Huggins at the Salem County Correctional Facility (SCCF) where he was held pending
trial.  Because no one filed a claim regarding the property, the items were administratively
forfeited.  Huggins subsequently filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture arguing that he
did not receive the notices.  The government filed a motion for summary judgment which
the District Court granted.  Huggins filed a notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1), a person entitled to notice in a nonjudicial
forfeiture proceeding may have the forfeiture set aside if the government failed to take
reasonable steps to provide notice and the person did not know or have reason to know of
the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim.  In Dusenbery v. United States,
534 U.S. 161 (2002), the government sent notice of the administrative forfeiture to the
incarcerated defendant via certified mail.  The Supreme Court described the procedures 
3used by the correctional facility for the delivery of certified mail to inmates:
prison mailroom staff traveled to the city post office every day
to obtain all the mail for the institution, including inmate mail. 
The staff signed for all certified mail before leaving the post
office. Once the mail was transported back to the facility,
certified mail was entered in a logbook maintained in the
mailroom.  A member of the inmate’s Unit Team then signed
for the certified mail to acknowledge its receipt before
removing it from the mailroom, and either a Unit Team
member or another staff member distributed the mail to the
inmate during the institution’s “mail call.” 
Id. at 169.  There was no paperwork confirming the delivery to the defendant in
Dusenbery because the mail logbooks were only kept for one year.  Id. at 165-66.  The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that actual notice was required and
found that the procedures used were “reasonably calculated, under all of the
circumstances, to apprise [petitioner] of the pendency of the action.”  Id. at 173 (quoting
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
Huggins argues that the District Court erred in holding that actual notice of
forfeiture is not required to satisfy due process.  However, as noted above, the Supreme
Court has held that actual notice is not required.  Huggins also contends that the District
Court erred in determining that the government met its burden of demonstrating that the
procedures at the Salem County Correctional Facility (SCCF) were reasonably calculated
to give him notice.  He asserts that the government provided no evidence of the mail
       In the District Court, the government submitted two affidavits from SCCF officials2
describing the delivery of the notices.  Lt. Lape asserted that in 2003 he was a Sergeant. 
Although he could not remember the exact date, he recalled that then Deputy Warden Ray
Skradinski asked him to deliver paperwork concerning the forfeiture to Huggins and that
he did as asked.  Supp. App. at 385.  Warden Skradinski stated that in 2003 he was the
Deputy Warden.  He asserted that in 2003, Jeff Mills was an employee whose duties
included retrieving certified mail addressed to prisoners from the local post office. 
Although he could not remember the exact date, Skradinski recalled asking then Sergeant
Lape to deliver the notices to Huggins and Lape reported that he did so.  Supp. App. at
387.
4
procedure in place at SCCF.   However, there is evidence in the record provided by2
Huggins himself describing the mail procedures at SCCF.  
They have a process here where an officer will go to the post
office, sign for the legal mail, then it is brought back to
S.C.C.F., given to maintenance, checked (opened outside the
presence of the inmate), then sent up front to be logged in by
a Sgt or Lt. in the computer, then sent to the Unit with a
receipt the housing officer has the inmate sign, for proof of
service upon him.  
Letter from Andre Huggins to District Court at 2 (Jun. 14, 2005)(Exhibit to Declaration at
docket entry #327).  These procedures are substantially similar to those that were found to
be constitutionally sufficient in Dusenbery.  Because we conclude that the procedures
used were reasonably calculated to apprise Huggins of the forfeiture proceeding, we need
not reach the issue of whether Huggins actually received the notices.
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
